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Abstract
We contrast the public interest theory with the public choice theory as an explanation for
entry regulation. These theories give sharply opposing predictions on how political rights
affect the way markets are designed in mobile telephony, where governments have to
decide the number of firms. The key to our approach is that in (analog) mobile telephony,
the fundamental market failure is a negative crowding externality, not the monopoly
welfare loss, and there is a single variable (the penetration ratio) that measures both the
risk of market failure, and the level of rents. Our discrete time hazard estimations show
that countries with better political rights (i) are more likely to allow entry of an additional
telecommunications operator and (ii) decrease the hazard of entry less in response to an
increase in the penetration ratio of mobile phones. These results support the public choice
theory, but are inconsistent with the public interest theory. They hence warn that entry in
mobile telecommunications may be guarded by a grabbing hand.
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1. Introduction
Government regulation of firms takes many forms. A prime example of the object of
such multi-layered regulation is the telecommunications sector, where for example
pricing decisions (Levy and Spiller, 1994, Gasmi, Laffont and Sharkey, 1999) and the
institutional environments for investment (Henisz and Zelner, 2001) have been
heavily regulated and also highly politicized. An additional layer prone to regulation
is entry. In its extreme form, entry regulation means that the government designs the
market by deciding the number of firms allowed to enter. Arguably, our
understanding of how entry is regulated in general and in the telecommunications
sector in particular is less developed than our understanding of optimal regulatory
schemes at a more micro-level (e.g. Laffont and Tirole, 1993), or our understanding
of how such micro-level regulation works (see e.g. Joskow and Rose, 1989). The
objective of this paper is to further our understanding of the political economy of
entry regulation. To this end, we study mobile telecommunications, a market which is
important as such and which due to the employed production technology provides an
attractive test-bed for entry regulation: In the mobile telecommunications sector, the
government makes an extreme regulatory discretion for it effectively designs the
market structure by deciding the number of participants that are allowed to enter.
To organize our approach, we contrast the public interest and public choice
theories of regulation. We develop new empirical tests of one against the other based
on the technological constraints of mobile telephony that arise from the limited
availability of radio spectrum. The tests provide us with new and sharp evidence in
favor of the public choice theory of regulation, suggesting that entry regulation is
instituted to further the objectives of those with access to rents from the activity rather
than to achieve social welfare objectives. This conclusion has far reaching policy
1implications and echoes the results obtained by Djankov et al. (2002), who were the
first to study entry regulation from the political economy perspective. Taken together,
these results suggest that entry regulation as it is practiced does not yield social
benefits and is potentially a source of economic inefficiency. Further, combining our
findings with those of Henisz and Zelner (2001) provides mobile telecommunications
practitioners with a more complete and nuanced picture of how and why entry is
regulated: The institutional environment for investment is not only characterized by a
risk of expropriation by the state, but also entry may be guarded by a grabbing hand.
Although we build our approach on Djankov et al. (2002), we go clearly on a
deeper microeconomic level. Unlike Djankov et al., who used a cross-country, inter-
industry data set to study entry regulation, we study how political institutions affect a
single well-defined government decision of allowing further entry into mobile
telephony, using international country-level panel data. The benefits of this approach
are fourfold: First, the market is well defined, thereby making decisions to allow
further entry comparable over time and across countries (after controlling for current
market structure). This comparability allows for a tighter link between theory,
political institutions, and regulatory decisions than is possible using cross-country,
cross-industry data, and reduces measurement error. Second, nation-level political
institutions are arguably exogenous to regulatory decisions in a single industry,
reducing the effects of endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity on the results;
Djankov et al. themselves raise these issues when interpreting their results. Our data
also allows us to explicitly control for unobserved heterogeneity. Third, we take a
dynamic perspective on regulation by addressing how political institutions affect the
way regulation reacts to the performance of the industry. Last but not least, the
2technological constraints and dynamics of the mobile telephony industry provide us
with sharp tests between the public interest theory and the public choice theory.1
A key characteristic of mobile telephony markets is the technological
constraint that arises from the limited availability of radio spectrum. Because of this
constraint (and governments’ universal property rights over the resource),
governments cannot avoid having to decide whom to allocate the spectrum needed for
mobile telephony. The scarcity of spectrum means that free entry is not an option. It
would lead to firms interfering with each others’ networks through increased usage,
degrading and eventually destroying the quality of voice/messages being transmitted
(see e.g. Chan and Vinodrai 1991, Hausmann 2002). This negative crowding
externality – not the deadweight loss of monopoly – is the fundamental market failure
of mobile telephony. The negative crowding externality was especially relevant on the
early analog mobile telephony markets on which we mainly focus (e.g. Raith and
Uddenfeldt 1991).2 Another key characteristic of the mobile telephony markets is that
their structure is dynamic. A reason for this is that governments find it difficult (or
sub-optimal) to commit to any particular market structure, implying that the decision
of whether or not to allow further entry has to be done repeatedly. The data bear this
out, providing us with inter-temporal variation in the number of firms, our dependent
variable.
We build on the above-mentioned two key characteristics of mobile telephony
to develop two tests of the public interest theory against the public choice theory. In
the first test we examine how the decision (=conditional probability) of whether or not
1 Moreover, mobile telephony is an important industry to study as such. It, in addition to the internet
and personal computers, has proven to be one of the major consumer innovations of recent decades.
Hausman (1997) estimates that the annual loss of U.S. consumer surplus from delaying the introduction
of (first generation) mobile telephones was of the order of tens of billions of dollars.
3to allow further entry changes as we move from a well-functioning democracy to a
dictatorship when controlling for the level of the penetration ratio of mobile phones.
Especially in analog networks, the penetration ratio is a measure of the risk of
encountering negative externalities in speech quality if further entry is allowed for. In
particular, the higher current usage, the higher is the risk that new entry would lead to
market failure through negative crowding externalities due to the firms not
internalizing the effects of their behavior on rivals’ call quality. As a result, public
interest theory predicts that for a given level of the analog penetration ratio, entry
regulation in well-functioning democracies is stricter than in dictatorships, where
government decisions are less aligned with consumer (voter) interests. On the other
hand, higher current usage also means higher potential rents. Public choice theory
predicts therefore the converse, i.e., controlling for the penetration ratio, entry
regulation in well-functioning democracies is less severe than in dictatorships. This is
because the agents of dictatorships have a greater incentive to introduce further
(excessive) entry regulation to protect the additional rents that the increase in the
penetration ratio makes available to them (at least potentially through, e.g.,
corruption).3
Our second test builds on the dynamic implications of the two theories: Public
interest theory predicts that a democratic government should tighten entry regulation
more than a dictatorial regime in response to an increase in the risk of market failure
(penetration ratio). Public choice theory predicts the opposite response to an increase
in the level of potential rents (also measured by the penetration ratio).
2 This externality is the key to our tests. Note that there is thus an important difference between the
motivation to regulate fixed line telephony (natural monopoly) and the need to regulate entry into
mobile telecommunications.
3 Those extracting rents that are due to despotic regimes may have good reasons – small likelihood of
staying in power for an extended period of time – to prefer current rents over future rents (see Djankov
et al., and Shleifer and Vishny, 1993).
4The mobile telephony market has a further advantage in that it provides two
tests of the feasibility of our modeling framework. It turns out that both the public
interest and the public choice theory predict that entry regulation should be weakly
increasing in the penetration ratio: This is testable implication that we take to data and
which we cannot reject. The second test of our modeling framework builds on yet
another key characteristic of mobile telephone markets. It is the technological
difference between analog and digital networks that arises from the tighter capacity
constraints of the former relative to those of the latter (e.g., Chan and Vinodrai 1990,
Raith and Uddenfeldt 1991, Hausman 2002). This upgrading of technology means
therefore two things. On the one hand, the risk of interference after new entry is less
of a problem in digital networks. On the other, there are fewer rents available because
looser capacity constraints typically mean tougher price competition (see e.g. Tirole
1988, pp. 211-218). The technological shift alters the way the political environment
affects the relation between current usage and entry regulation: It should become
weaker or disappear entirely in the digital networks. This test is conditional, for it
cannot distinguish between the two theories of regulation. It does, however, provide
us with an important robustness check of our empirical set-up, conditional on the first
test indicating that our modeling framework fits our data. We find that our data
supports the above implications, providing further evidence that our approach, based
on key features of the technology, is appropriate.
To study the effect of political institutions on market design and execute our
tests, we have gathered a global data set that combines information on the mobile
telephony market, such as number of licenses, concentration, penetration ratio and so
on, with country characteristics and information on political institutions. We have
information of political institutions for a total of 138 countries, and 893 country-year
5observations. Using these data and hazard rate models we find that better political
rights lead to a lower hazard rate (conditional probability) of allowing further entry,
conditioning on the penetration ratio.4 Executing our second test, we find that in
democracies, an increase in the penetration ratio leads to a smaller increase of entry
regulation. These results provide support for the public choice theory of regulation.
Apart from Djankov et al., so far there has been little quantitative empirical
work on entry regulation using international data. Telecommunications, including its
deregulation process, has been studied intensively, but again, quantitative work using
international data is rare.5 Exceptions are Duso and Röller (2001) who study
deregulation in OECD countries using political economy variables, and Henisz’ and
Zelner’s (2001) study of the effects of political institutions on telecommunications
infrastructure investment using data from 147 countries. Toivanen (2004) studies the
timing of introducing mobile telephony in a given country, and shows that countries
with better political rights took indirect network effects more into account, were faster
to introduce mobile telephony, and put more weight on there being some domestic
human capital in the telecoms sector. Qualitative accounts of deregulation are plenty
(see e.g. Spiller and Cardilli, 1997).
The next section describes mobile technology and its economics in more
detail. The opposing hypotheses are also developed in this section. We present our
data, and take a first cut at the effects of political institutions by presenting some
conditional distributions in section 3. Our econometric model, main results and a
series of robustness tests are described in section 4. In section 5, we offer conclusions.
4 That is, we study what determines the probability of introducing a new firm into the market,
conditional on it not having happened before.
62. The mobile telephony industry
A. Technology
The history of mobile telephony markets has been described in detail in several
articles (e.g. Hausman, 2002), so we offer only a brief synopsis here. Mobile
telephony is a recent innovation. The technology for implementing mobile telephony
reached implementation stage by the 1970’s, with the U.S. and Japan being the first
countries to decide on a mobile phone standard (i.e., the technical features that dictate
how the network operates and communicates with the handsets). Standards, and
especially generations differ in how effectively they use the radio spectrum, which is
the key resource in mobile telephony. Any standard needs some radio spectrum, and
governments have property rights over it. With the advent of mobile telephony,
governments found themselves in the position of having to decide how much
spectrum to allocate for this use, and whom to allocate it.6
The technology used during the 1980’s was analog, whereas the current
generation of mobile phones (the so-called 2nd generation, 2G) is based on digital
technologies. Main differences between analog and digital are the quality of voice,
and, linked to this, the effectiveness by which they use the radio spectrum.7 With
5 Examples of quantitative work not using international data are Donald and Sappington (1995), who
analyze US deregulation, and Duso (2001), who focuses on the effects of political regime within US
states on the incidence and effectiveness of regulation.
6 For example, the choice of a particular mobile phone standard was in some countries affected by the
fact that some parts of the spectrum were allocated for military use. Standards using that spectrum were
then not in the choice set of the government.
7 For example, Chan and Vinodrai (1990), Uddenfeldt, Raith and Hedberg (1988), Lee (1994), and
Sundberg and Seshadari (1990) discuss the transition from analog to digital mobile telephony. All
mention as the main motivation increased capacity. To take an example, Chan and Vinodrai write
(p.191):”… This phenomenal growth creates pressure on radio spectrum. The present radio frequency
allocation for cellular in major cities in North America is being used up rapidly. The exhaust of this
radio spectrum is causing capacity problems in these cities. The result is that there is a higher blockage
rate, dropped calls and interference which are detrimental to the cellular operators. …  This problem can
only be addressed by a second generation of radio technology that can offer larger capacity.”
7analog, each user occupied fully a given channel of band of spectrum.8 In digital, each
frequency channel can be divided among many users.
There are at least four ways how competing operators (that face capacity
constraints) might under free entry (and no regulation) compromise each others’ call
quality: First, they could simply and outrageously try to occupy the entire band
currently used by the rival. A means to do so is to direct traffic randomly across all
the channels of bands used by the rivals. Second, a fiercely competing operator could
direct traffic to the channels of its “own” band of spectrum that are adjacent to those
of its rival’s bands. These ”guard channels” are typically not used precisely because
they compromise the quality of calls transmitted in the channels of the neighboring
bands. Third, for a given amount of available spectrum, further entry would mean that
bands available to each operator would become more meagre (i.e. “thinner”). The
thinner the bands, the fewer channels firms have. This increases the risk that the
amount of traffic exceeds bands’ capacity and that call quality is compromised. Thus,
if the so called Effective Frequency Load (EFL) increases too much, quality is
compromised, even if firms did not intentionally enter each others’ bands. Finally,
there is a competitive effect. If competition lowers prices and increases demand for
calls, EFL naturally increases. For a given amount and allocation of spectrum, this
means that the risk of quality problems increases, because an operator cannot increase
the amount of calls indefinitely without causing increasing interference (which in the
end destroys call quality).
To sum up, both further entry and the competition it would have introduced
would have lead to more traffic, and thereby more interference. Even though analog
technologies improved their performance over time, the technology still restricted the
8 The firm bandwidth is divided into sub-bands, called channels, and one channel is occupied by one
8number of firms that could operate simultaneously without interfering with each
others’ voice quality (see fn. 7). These constraints are, however, clearly less of a
problem in digital networks (e.g. Zako and Short, 1992). A primary reason for this is
that in digital networks one frequency channel can be used more effectively. For
example, in many current GSM systems one channel can be divided between 16 users
by using the so called Half Rate system feature. However, some risk of capacity and
interference problems still exists.9
B. Market design
As detailed in many accounts (see e.g. Hausman, 2002), for example the U.S. has
used several different ways of allocating spectrum. Before one can allocate spectrum,
a decision as to the number of licensees has to be made. The number of licenses
translates (almost)10 one-to-one into the number of firms in the market. This is why
governments effectively had to design the markets in mobile telephony. A
government is not stuck with the current market structure, but can revise it any time.
Our data shows this indeed to be the case. It is this variation, in addition to the one
over countries, which we exploit in our econometric analysis.
Japan, Brunei and the Scandinavian countries (in late 1970’s and early 1980’s)
were the first ones to build the necessary infrastructure, design the market, and open
up their markets for consumers. During that time, the operators in the market were
user in analog systems. See also Hausman (2002) who briefly describes the capacity constraints of the
early mobile telephone systems.
9 Evidence of this is, first, that engineers continued doing research on how to expand the capacity of
digital networks: see e.g. Schiml (1994), Raith and Uddenfeldt (1991), and Nielsen, Wigard, and
Mogensen (1997). Second, a recent anecdote shows that capacity can still be a problem: A Finnish
telecom operator using 2G technology instituted a “Happy Hour” in the Spring of 2004 during which
calls were free. Within days the operator had to cancel the arrangement because the level of calls
blocked its network.
10 Although not in 1G, only moderately in 2G, and increasingly in 3G there are instances where a firm
has been slow to enter the market after obtaining a license.
9mostly either government owned telecom monopolies, or regulated private
monopolies. Consequently, most countries launched their mobile telecom markets
with a monopoly operator.11 Half of the countries that initiated competition at the
same time as the first mobile phone network was launched did so using an analog
standard. The introduction of digital mobile telephony, starting in Scandinavia in
early 1990s, offered a clear technological break in terms of how many firms could
technically operate in a given market. In many countries, analog and digital networks
coexist/ed for several years.
In the empirics, we will use data on market structures from both the analog
and the digital periods, and control for the introduction of digital technology.12 As we
will explain shortly, the differences in the technological constraints of analog and
digital networks, and the eventual introduction of the better digital technology, allow
us to design tests that we can use to evaluate how our empirical framework fits the
data.
C. Economic and Political Rationales for Entry Regulation
The source of market failure in mobile telecommunications is the risk of destruction
of call quality due to uncontrolled and uncoordinated use of the radio spectrum. The
larger the current traffic and hence effective frequency load (i.e., EFL), the higher the
risk of interference in speech quality if further entry is allowed for. In particular, the
higher current usage, the higher is the risk that new entry would lead to a market
failure due to the firms not internalizing the effects their behavior has on rivals’ call
quality. This is because entry increases competition and because more competition
11 Exceptions are listed in the Appendix.
12 The existence and introduction of a digital network is potentially endogenous in our modeling
framework, and one for which it would be hard to find an appropriate instrument. Our key results are
unaffected by in- or exclusion of digital network variables.
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results in lower prices and higher usage. How governments respond to the risk of
destruction of call quality therefore affects the decision of whether or not to allow
further entry. How this decision changes as we move from a well-functioning
democracy to a dictatorship can be used to test whether the public interest theory is
supported by the data. Public interest theory predicts that conditional on current
usage, entry regulation should be higher, the better aligned the regulatory decisions
are with the welfare of the society. In other words, the more democratic a country, the
higher should entry regulation be, conditional on current usage.
Higher current usage, however, also means higher potential rents. The more
concentrated the market, the higher the rents that the regulators, bureaucrats, and
other agents of government can extract. Public choice theory therefore predicts that
after conditioning on current usage, entry regulation should be lower, the better the
regulatory decisions are aligned with those of the society (the smaller the propensity
of the regulators to extract rents through the regulatory process). Thus, the more
democratic a country, the lower should entry regulation be, conditional on current
usage. The prediction of the public choice theory regarding the level of entry
regulation, conditional on current usage, is thus exactly the reverse of that of public
interest theory. The tests executed by Djankov et al. rely solely on these diametrically
opposite predictions.
We can go on a deeper microeconomic level, for in addition to these effects,
there are others that come through changes in the penetration ratio. Public interest
theory predicts that an increase in the analog penetration ratio of mobile phones leads
to a larger increase in entry regulation (i.e., a lower conditional probability of entry)
in well-functioning democracies than in dictatorships. This prediction holds, because
better political rights lead to a higher congruence between policy outcomes and social
11
preferences and thus make the more democratic government more responsive to
increases in the risk of market failure. It turns out that public choice theory suggests
the opposite: Public choice theory predicts that an increase in the analog penetration
ratio of mobile phones leads to a smaller increase in regulation (i.e. in a higher
conditional probability of entry) in well-functioning democracies than in
dictatorships. This is because the agents of dictatorships have a greater incentive to
introduce further (excessive) entry regulation to protect the additional rents that the
increase in the penetration ratio makes available to them (at least potentially through,
e.g., corruption).13 This prediction holds, because the more democratic the regime is,
the less responsive is the entry regulator to increased rent-creation and extraction
opportunities.
Both the risk of market failure and potential rents are functions of usage (i.e.
the penetration ratio), which means that the opposite predictions of the two theories
can easily be summarized in two graphs. In Figures 1A and 1B we measure usage
(i.e., the risk of market failure or the potential rents; denoted U in the figures) on the
x-axis and the amount (severity) of entry regulation on the y-axis. Both theories
predict that there would be no entry regulation if U » 0, i.e., without market failure or
rents. They also predict that the amount (severity) of entry regulation is (weakly)
increasing in the current usage irrespective of the political regime. This translates into
the prediction that the conditional probability of entry is (weakly) decreasing in the
penetration ratio, conditional on the prevailing market structure. This provides us with
a first check of our econometric specification, and as we report below, it indeed
passes the check.
13 Those extracting rents that are due to despotic regimes may have good reasons – small likelihood of
staying in power for an extended period of time – to prefer current rents over future rents (see Djankov
et al., and Shleifer and Vishny, 1993).
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In terms of Figure 1A and 1B, the key difference between the public interest
theory and the public choice theory is that if the former holds, entry regulations
increase faster as a function of the degree of (risk of) market failure in democracies
where voters’ and politicians’ interest are better aligned than in dictatorships. This
difference is shown in Figure 1A, where we have drawn different “entry regulation
functions” for a well-functioning democracy and for a dictatorship. Both start from
the origin, but the former increases faster than the latter. Conversely, public choice
theory predicts that in democracies, the amount of available rents should not affect the
regulatory regime, but in dictatorships entry regulation is an increasing function of
potential rents. This difference is show in Figure 1B, where the “entry regulation
function” of a well-functioning democracy increases less rapidly than that of a
dictatorship.
 [FIGURES 1A AND 1B HERE]
This difference generates the two testable predictions of the theories. First, as
Figures 1A and 1B show, for a given level of usage, the theories predict a different
ordering of the level of entry regulation in terms of how democratic a regime is.
Holding U constant, public interest theory predicts a higher degree of entry regulation
in democracies than in a dictatorship, and the public choice theory predicts the
converse. Second, higher usage simultaneously increases the probability of market
failure occurring through interference with other customers’ calls and potential rents.
In terms of Figure 1A, public interest theory predicts that for a given increase in usage
(i.e. UD  > 0), DERD  > DIRD , where DERD  and DIRD  denote the increase in entry
regulation in well-functioning democracies and in a less well-functioning democracy
(or in a dictatorship). Public choice theory predicts the converse. In terms of Figure
1B, its prediction is that for a given UD  > 0, DERD  < DIRD .
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In the empirics, we measure entry regulation by its inverse, the conditional
probability of entry, i.e., the hazard rate of allowing further entry. The testable
hypotheses that the public interest theory generates against the public choice theory
and the tests that we take to data are thus the following:
Test 1: Holding U constant, the conditional probability of entry is lower in
democratic than in less democratic regimes if the public interest theory holds
and the probability is higher in democratic than in less democratic regimes if
the public choice theory holds;
Test 2: For a given UD  > 0, the conditional probability of entry is reduced
more in democratic than in less democratic regimes if the public interest
theory holds and is reduced less in democratic than in less democratic regimes
if the public choice theory holds.
Like Djankov et al., we will only be able to estimate the ‘‘net’’ of the two
theories, because a reconciliation of the theories is possible and because we rely on
reduced form estimations. Our results do indicate, however, which of the two theories
is empirically more dominant.
Because of the tighter capacity constraints of analog technologies, these
effects should be stronger if analog rather than digital technology is used. The
technological shift alters the way political environment affects the relation between
current usage and entry regulation: It becomes weaker or disappears entirely in the
digital networks. The reason for this is that (i) the risk of interference after new entry
is less of a problem in digital networks and (ii) that there are fewer rents on the table,
because looser capacity constraints typically mean tougher price competition (see e.g.
Tirole 1988, pp. 211-218). It worth repeating that this test is conditional, for it cannot
14
distinguish between the two theories of regulation. It does, however, provide us with
the second robustness check of our empirical set-up.
3. Data
Our mobile telephony data comes from EMC, 14 which is the standard industry source
for such data. We have data on the number of licenses, the number of areas a country
is divided into, the actual standards in use, and operator level data on the number of
subscribers on an annual basis. We also know whether consumers could buy so-called
prepaid cards for the mobile phones. To this data we have matched main economic
and demographic variables plus some telecoms variables from World Bank’s World
Development Indicators, the legal origin and latitude variables from La Porta et al.
(1997)15, and three other variables commonly used in empirical political economy:
political and civil rights (Freedom House, 2000),16 Henisz’ (2000) measure of
political constraints on the excutive, and Jaggers’ and Marshall’s (2000) measure of
political rights.
Political and civil rights have been used in many macroeconomic studies (e.g.
Easterly and Levine, 1997, Rodrik, 1999). These are known to be highly correlated
14 See http://www.emc-database.com/.
15 As shown by La Porta et al. (1999), legal origins of a country are a key determinant of the quality of
government. They show that French legal origin countries have inferior government performance
compared to common law (English origin, but also German and Scandinavian origin) countries.
16 Political rights and civil rights are defined by Freedom House as follows: “To answer the political
rights questions, Freedom House considers to what extent the system offers voters the opportunity to
choose freely from among candidates and to what extent the candidates are chosen independently of the
state. However, formal electoral procedures are not the only factors that determine the real distribution
of power. In many countries, the military retains a significant political role, while in others, the king
maintains considerable power over the elected politicians. In answering the civil liberties questions,
Freedom House does not equate constitutional guarantees of human rights with the on-the-ground
fulfillment of these rights. For states and territories with small populations, particularly tiny island
nations, the absence of trade unions and other forms of association is not necessarily viewed as a
negative situation unless the government or other centers of domination are deliberately blocking their
establishment or operation.”(http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/methodology.htm,
accessed April 30th, 2004).
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(correlation in the current sample 0.92, significant at 1% level), and we follow
previous studies in combining the two measures. Countries with highest rated political
rights
“come closest to the ideals suggested by the checklist questions, beginning with
free and fair elections. Those who are elected rule, there are competitive parties
or other political groupings, and the opposition plays an important role and has
actual power. Minority groups have reasonable self-government or can participate
in the government through informal consensus”17
Countries with highest civil rights
“come closest to the ideals expressed in the civil liberties checklist, including
freedom of expression, assembly, association, education, and religion. They are
distinguished by an established and generally equitable system of rule of law.
Countries and territories with this rating enjoy free economic activity and tend to
strive for equality of opportunity”.18
The combined measure varies between two (highest level of political and civil rights)
and 14 (lowest level). As alternative measures, we use Henisz’ (2000) measure on
constraints on executive power (see e.g. Djankov et al., 2002), and the ‘polity’
measure of Jaggers and Marshall (2000).
Conditioning on there being at least one firm in the mobile telephony market
of a country in a given year (i.e., that the market exists; see Toivanen 2004 for an
analysis of the decision to open the mobile telephony market), dropping countries that
divide their area into several different (sub-) markets (examples are China, India, and
the U.S.19), and countries for which we lack data on the key variables, resulted in a
data set that contains 138 countries and a total of 893 observations.
17 Quoted from http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/methodology.htm (accessed
May 20th, 2004).
18 Quoted from http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/methodology.htm (accessed
May 20th, 2004).
19 This means that having multiple firms on the market is not necessarily an indication of there being
competition. The full list of countries where licenses are not national and where the inference from the
number of licenses to the number of competitors that we wish to make is not possible can be found in
the Appendix.
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The descriptive statistics are given in Table 1. The table shows that the
countries are very heterogenous. The mean penetration ratios are low. This is
explained by us having several developing countries in our data. Markets are very
concentrated, with the mean Herfindahl index being above 0.8, meaning that the
markets are on average much more concentrated than having a duopoly with two
equal-sized firms (which would generate a Herfindahl index of 0.5). Some 40% of our
country-year observations are from countries with French legal origin.
[TABLE 1 HERE]
We have plotted the average number of licenses (firms), the proportion of countries
with more than one firm, and the count of countries with more than one firm in Figure
2. Several countries introduce competition during the analog era. This is testimony to
the possibility of the analog technology (1G standards) being able to accommodate
competition even if the capacity constraints are tighter than with digital 2G standards.
Nonetheless, the number of countries with at least two firms starts to grow faster after
1990, coinciding with the introduction of the 2nd generation digital networks. By the
end of our observation period in 1998, 78 countries out of 161 (48%) have introduced
competition in mobile telephony. The proportion of countries with competition does
not increase as rapidly, because several countries that enter our data set (through
introduction of mobile telephony) in the 1990s have monopolies. The average number
of firms is two by 1998.
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
In Table 2 we present some information on market structure at the end of our
observation period, conditioned on different political economy variables. We
condition the number of firms in the market by end of 1998 on the country having
median or worse political and civil rights, or above median political and civil rights.
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Although the differences aren’t large, countries with above median political rights
have on average slightly more firms than countries with median or worse rights.
Conditional medians also suggest that better political rights lead to less entry
regulation (more firms). These observations echo those made by Djankov et al. (2002,
Table VI) and support the public choice theory, as they suggest that entry regulation
is tighter in more despotic countries.
[TABLE 2 HERE]
4. Estimation and Results
A. Econometric model
A natural way to model econometrically the time until the introduction of the next
increase in the number of firms is to use a hazard rate model. Given that our data is
annual, we estimate discrete time hazard models, and allow for a time-varying
baseline hazard. The period specific hazard rate takes in these models the form
(Jenkins 2004)
(1) )]exp(exp[1)( ' jitijj XXh gb +--= ,
where )( ijj Xh  is the discrete time hazard in the jth time interval, itX  is a vector of
possibly time-varying covariates characterizing country i, b  is a vector of parameters
to be estimated, and
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where ijy  is an indicator that equals one if country i adopted a standard in period j,
and is zero otherwise.
There are three econometric decisions to make: First, we have to choose how
to model the baseline hazard. For the most part, we assume that the baseline hazard is
distributed Weibull, but (as we will show), allowing for a non-parametric baseline
does not alter our results.20 Second, and related to the first choice, there are two ways
to introduce time into this setting. One is to use calendar time; the other is to use time
from last entry. In our application, the former has the benefit of better tracking
technological development which happens on a global scale. The latter’s advantage is
that it corresponds to the standard way of defining time in a hazard rate setting. We
will use both to illustrate that our results do not depend on they way we keep track of
time. Finally, one can also add unobserved heterogeneity into the model. As we will
show, controlling for observables, there is no such heterogeneity in our data. Our
results do not depend on it being added to the model.
B. Results
A key question asked by Djankov et al. (Table VII) is, “Do countries with more
limited and representative governments have less entry regulation?” Their answer is
yes. We start by showing that our data is consistent with this finding when using their
specification. To this end, we include as covariates only the log of GDP per capita, the
20 The model allows us to control for unobservable changes over time, such as changes in the fixed
costs of building a network. To have such controls is potentially important, because there are costs
involved in allowing further entry. A prime example of such costs is the resources that the new entrant
typically needs to sink to build its network infrastructure. The significance of these costs is apparent in
the decision of many European countries (e.g. Germany, Finland, Sweden) to allow operators with a
third generation license to share their network infrastructure. As the development of technology in this
industry was largely on a global scale, we will control for such cost changes by allowing the baseline
hazard to depend on (calendar) time.
19
current number of firms in the market, and the Freedom House political and civil
rights, which decreases in the level of political and civil rights. It is natural to control
for GDP per capita, as without it, the political variables could simply proxy income
levels and demand. We include the (current) number of firms in the market for two
reasons: First, allowing entry of a second firm is an inherently different decision than
allowing entry of an nth firm. Second, if there is unobserved heterogeneity that affects
decisions to allow for further entry, this should be nicely captured by past decisions,
which the number of firms in the market measures (not unlike Blundell, Griffith and
Windmeijer 2001).
We report the results for the regression replicating Djankov et al. in column
(1) of Table 3. We find that GDP per capita carries a negative coefficient, which is
significant at 11% level. This finding is consistent with Djankov et al.’s result and
interpretation that GDP per capita may also be a rough proxy for the degree of some
form of general market failure, and their empirical finding that the number of entry
regulation procedures is increasing in GDP per capita (ibid., Table VII). The number
of licenses obtains a positive and highly significant coefficient. The interpretation is
that the higher is the number of firms currently in the market, the higher is the
probability of allowing further entry. This suggests to us that the variable is indeed
capturing unobserved heterogeneity, i.e. that countries with regimes that are more
likely to grant further licenses have more firms already in the market (due to past
similar decisions). We find no statistically significant evidence of time-varying
changes in the (conditional) probability of further entry. Political and civil rights has a
negative and significant coefficient. Better functioning democracies have a higher
hazard rate of allowing further entry. If one believes our (and Djankov et al.’s)
assumption that better political rights lead to higher congruence between regulatory
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decisions and consumer surplus, this finding is evidence for the public choice theory
and against the public interest theory of regulation. It thus replicates the key finding
of Djankov et al. (ibid., Table VII).
[TABLE 3 HERE]
While GDP per capita may be a proxy for the degree of market failure and the
amount of rents available, we have in the penetration ratio a much more direct
measure for both because of the industry we study. Recall that we test public interest
theory against the public choice theory using two tests: In the first, we look at the
effect of political and civil rights on the entry hazard, controlling for the penetration
ratio. In the second, we look at how the effect of an increase in the penetration ratio
on the hazard rate of entry changes when political and civil rights are increased.
Recall also that we test our modeling framework by first checking that the entry
hazard is (weakly) decreasing in the penetration ratio (reported as Test 0 in Table 3),
and second, by testing (conditional on the findings with the analog-results) the effects
of political and civil rights are weaker after digital technology has been introduced
than before.
In column (2) we execute our Test 1: Whether and how better political
institutions affect the relation between the entry hazard and the penetration ratio. The
coefficient of GDP per capita isn’t significant anymore in column (2). The number of
licenses continues to have a positive and significant effect on the hazard rate of
further entry. We have weak evidence that the hazard rate declines over time, but
cannot reject the null hypothesis of a constant baseline hazard. What’s more
instrumental for our empirical framework is that conditional on existing market
structure, for all values of political and civil rights, an increase in the analog
penetration ratio decreases the hazard rate of entry, i.e., it increases entry regulation.
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Our framework thus seems to suit the data. Proceeding to Test 1, we find that the
coefficient of political and civil rights in column (2) is negative and significant. This
means that conditional on existing level of risk of market failure and rents, the hazard
rate of entry is higher  - and therefore the degree of entry regulation lower  - in a
democracy than in a dictatorship (as the political and civil rights variable obtains
small values for democracies, and large values for dictatorships). This result supports
the public choice theory of regulation, and is evidence against the public interest
theory of regulation.
To execute Test 2, we introduce the interaction between political and civil
rights and the analog penetration ratio in column (3). Checking first that our
framework continues to fit the data, we find that the lowest value (and statistically
weakest result) is obtained for the best political and civil rights (for which the political
and civil rights variable obtains the value two): -6.370*2 + 4.820 = -7.920, significant
at 9% level (see Test 0 in Table 3). When we set the political and civil rights to their
2nd lowest possible (or higher) value, we reject the null hypothesis at better than 1%
level. When further controls are introduced (see columns (4) and (5) in Table 3), these
results are further strengthened. This finding is evidence in favor of our testing
framework, and we therefore proceed to discuss the results of column (3), where we
again implement Test 1, and implement Test 2.
For Test 1, we hold the penetration ratio (risk of market failure in the public
interest theory, level of potential rents in the public choice theory) constant, and test
how the hazard rate of entry is affected by a change in political and civil rights. Both
the political and civil rights variable’s and the penetration ratio – political and civil
rights interaction’s coefficients are negative. The interpretation of this is that in
democracies (for which the political and civil rights variable obtains low values),
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entry regulation is less strict than in dictatorships, in line with our finding in column
(2). This is (recall Test 1 and Figures 1A and 1B) evidence in favor of the public
choice theory and against the public interest theory of regulation. The evidence in
column (3) is however weak in the sense that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of
no effect of political and civil rights at conventional levels of significance (p-values
are around 16% for any value of the penetration ratio). The obvious reason for this is
that the direct effect of the political and civil rights variable on entry hazard is very
imprecisely measured, and in terms of absolute value dominates the significant
interaction coefficient.
Test 2 involves looking at how the effect of an increase in the penetration ratio
on the hazard rate of entry is affected by political and civil rights. This is measured by
the coefficient of the penetration ratio – political and civil rights interaction variable:
It is negative and significant at the 5% level. The interpretation is that in democracies
(with low values of the political and civil rights variable), an increase in the
penetration ratio leads to a smaller increase in entry regulation (smaller decrease in
the hazard of entry) than in dictatorships. Both tests thus provide evidence in favor of
the public choice theory and against the public interest theory of regulation.
In column (4) we introduce the digital penetration ratio and its interaction with
political and civil rights. This specification tests whether the technological shift from
analog to digital networks alters the way political environment affects the relation
between current usage and entry regulation. As we explained, our model predicts that
the relation becomes weaker or disappears entirely in the digital networks. Our
empirical set-up passes this specification test, for neither the linear (digital penetration
ration) nor its interaction with political and civil rights obtains significant coefficients.
This supports the view that the introduction of digital technology shifted the capacity
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constraint in a discrete fashion (see also below). Otherwise, the results are similar to
those in column (3). In particular, an increase in the analog penetration ratio now
decreases the hazard rate of entry for all values of the political and civil rights -
variable, and this negative relation is statistically significant at better than 5% level.
Further, the coefficient of the interaction term between the penetration ratio and the
political and civil rights -variable is negative and highly significant.
In column (5) we introduce further controls. We control for the geographic
area of a country, population, share of women and urban population, and the age-
dependency ratio. These have been found to have an impact on mobile phone
diffusion in earlier work (see Gruber and Verboven, 2001, and Liikanen, Stoneman
and Toivanen, 2004). We include latitude, and legal origin dummies as controls for
differences in political regimes (see e.g. La Porta et al., 1999). We include indicator
variables for a country having digital (2G) technology as of year t+1,21 and for having
pre-paid phone cards. As explained, digital technology constituted a shift in the
severity of the technological constraint on the (optimal) number of firms; prepaid
cards are said to have increased penetration in countries where they’ve been
introduced. We also control for the concentration ratio of the mobile telephony
market, and for the penetration ratio of fixed line phones. Concentration ratio is a
measure of the competitiveness of the market, and fixed line phones have been shown
to be a substitute for mobile phones (Gruber and Verboven 2001, Liikanen, Stoneman
and Toivanen, 2004).
We find that our main result is robust to introducing the new control variables:
The interaction between the analog penetration ratio and political and civil rights
21 This definition was chosen to accommodate the fact that the introduction of 2G was often
accompanied by a decision to allow further entry.
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again obtains a negative and significant coefficient, and the interaction between the
digital penetration ratio and political and civil rights obtains a negative, but highly
insignificant coefficient. Several controls obtain significant coefficients. The higher
the proportion of women, the higher the hazard rate of allowing further entry.
Similarly, the higher the age-dependency ratio, the higher the hazard rate. The digital
technology indicator carries a large and positive coefficient, as does the concentration
ratio, and the digital penetration ratio. The last of these suggests that the two
technological generations are indeed different. The digital networks can accommodate
a larger number of firms. None of the controls for legal origins obtains a significant
coefficient. The number of licenses again has a positive and significant coefficient.
C. Robustness tests
We have performed a number of robustness tests using column (5) as the base
specification: As a first robustness test, we re-estimated the model controlling (via
random effects) for unobserved heterogeneity. We did not find any and reproduced
our main results. We also estimated the model both allowing for a non-parametric
baseline hazard, and using time since introduction of mobile telephony in a given
country instead of calendar time. With the latter, we found an increasing baseline
hazard. Our results were robust to these changes, and using the alternative time
definition, statistically strengthened with the coefficient of the interaction between
political and civil rights, and the analog penetration ratio significant at 1% level.
Finally, we used different measures of political rights. Using only political (not civil)
rights of Freedom House, the political constraints of Henisz, or the Jaggers and
Marshall measure of political rights essentially reproduced the reported results.22
Using only political rights resulted in the interaction term’s between political rights
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and analog penetration coefficient being significant at 8% level. Using Jaggers’ and
Marshall’s measure, the linear variable carried a coefficient significant coefficient at
9% level, while the interaction’s coefficient was significant at 3% level. Using the
specification of column (5) and Henisz’ measure of political constraints the
interaction with the analog penetration ratio became insignificant. However, using the
more parsimonious specification of column (3) produced statistically stronger results
for the interaction term for this particular alternative measure of political rights, and
also for the other alternative measures of political rights.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we seek to contribute to the understanding of how entry regulation
comes about by empirically contrasting the public choice and public interest theories
of regulation, studying a single industry using international country-level panel data.
The appeal of such an approach is that one can more readily give a causal
interpretation to the results, as regulatory decisions in a single industry – in contrast to
general government performance or policies – is unlikely to affect measures of
political institutions. We studied how political rights affect a government’s decision to
allow the entry of one more firm into the mobile telephony market. The appeal of this
industry for our purposes is twofold: First, the fundamental market failure is a
negative crowding externality, not the traditional monopoly welfare loss. Second,
with the advent of mobile telephony, governments found themselves in the position of
having to decide the market structure of this market. The first fact means that the
public interest and public choice theories generate sharply different predictions on
22 To obtain comparability we multiplied Henisz’ measure (running from 0 to 1, and increasing in the
constraints) by -10, and that of Jaggers and Marshall (running from -10 to 10 and increasing in political
rights) by -.5.
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how regulation works in the industry. The second fact means that we are studying a
genuine regulatory decision.
We find that, even after controlling for country characteristics and market
performance, countries with better political rights are more likely to allow entry of an
additional firm into the market, conditional on the penetration ratio. Especially,
countries with better political rights react more vigorously to the performance of the
market. These results support the public choice theory of regulation (in line with
Djankov et al.’s results), which states that regulations are instituted to benefit
politicians, civil servants, and other agents of government. In addition they suggest
that it is not only the institutional environment for investment of incumbents that is
characterized by a risk of expropriation by the state (Henisz and Zelner, 2001). Our
analysis indicates that also entry may be guarded by a grabbing hand.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Surface 000 000 sq. km. 0.674 1.652
Population 000 000’s 27.700 88.400
Proportion of Female Population, % 49.731 5.005
Proportion of Urban Population, % 60.312 22.126
Age-dependency Ratio, [0,1] 0.609 0.183
Gdp per capita  US$ PPP 9369.06 7127.62
Latitude 0.342 0.209
Penetration Ratio of Analog Mobile Phones,
[0,1] 0.012 0.024
Penetration Ratio of Digital  Mobile Phones,
[0,1] 0.009 0.032
Prepaid Indicator 0.043 0.203
Digital Technology  Indicator 0.411 0.492
Fixed Line Phone Penetration, [0,1] 0.228 0.201
Herfindahl Index [0,1] 0.846 0.265
French Legal Origin Indicator 0.404 0.491
German Legal Origin 0.055 0.229
Scandinavian Legal Origin 0.086 0.281
Socialist Legal Origin 0.140 0.348
Political and Civil Rights, [2,14] 5.806 3.785
Political Constraints, [0,1] .325 .222
Polity, [-10,10] 4.904 6.506
Protestant % 17.435 27.498
Catholic 37.443 38.172
Muslim 18.056 33.592
NOTE: Digital Technology Indicator takes the value 1 for country i in year t if from
year t+1 onwards, there is a 2G network in operation in country i.
Table 2
Market Structure in 1998 Conditional on Political Economy
Measure
Median
# Firms
Mean #
Firms
Std. Dev.
Median or Below Political and Civil Rights 1 1.84 1.42
Above Median Political and Civil Rights 2 2.08 1.16
NOTE: Sample of countries conditioned on there being one area of operation for mobile phone operators.
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Table 3
Hazard Rate Estimation Results
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gdp per capita -.230*
(.141)
-.056
(.160)
0.024
(.165)
-.007
(.171)
-502
(.333)
# licenses 0.607***
(.059)
.643***
(.061)
.694***
(.064)
.693***
(.064)
1.362***
(.141)
Political and civil rights -.081**
(.039)
-.089**
(.040)
-.058
(.042)
-.053
(.042)
-.043
(.052)
Political and civil rights
* analog penetration
ratio
- - -6.370***
(2.520)
-5.370**
(2.700)
-6.840**
(3.080)
Analog penetration ratio - -11.8**
(5.22)
4.820
(7.260)
0.514
(8.230)
-1.860
(11.6)
Political and civil rights
* digital penetration
ratio
- - -1.720
(2.630)
-.858
(1.780)
Digital penetration ratio - - - 6.960
(6.460)
12.1**
(5.53)
Latitude - - - - -.134
(1.144)
French legal origin - - - - -.201
(.313)
German - - - - .332
(.524)
Scandinavian - - - - -.339
(.733)
Socialist - - - - -.632
(.543)
Surface - - - - .077
(.100)
Population - - - - .005
(.004)
Female - - - - .207*
(.116)
Urban - - - - .010
(.010)
Age-dependency ratio - - - - -1.628*
(.956)
Prepaid - - - - -.049
(.415)
Digital indicator - - - - 1.120***
(.321)
Main telephone lines - - -  - -584
(1506)
Herfindahl - - - - 5.330***
(0.754)
Log time .532
(.352)
.738**
(.368)
.720**
(.369)
.635*
(.380)
-.147
(.443)
Constant -2.107
(1.705)
-4.016**
(1.898)
-4.909***
(1.945)
-4.586**
(2.050)
-14.190**
(6.974)
# obs. 893 893 893 893 893
LogL. -280.116 -277.101 -272.104 -271.279 -222.791
Test 0 - 0.024 0.091 0.047 0.057
Test 1 0.039 0.026 0.161 0.208 0.414
Test 2 - - 0.011 0.046 0.026
LR1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LR2 - - - - 0.000
NOTES: The reported numbers are coefficient and standard error. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1%
levels. All the penetration variables’ coefficients (analog, digital, main line, and interactions with other variables) have
been multiplied by 10 000.
Test 0 = p-value of test of whether the hazard rate is decreasing in the hazard rate.
Test 1 = p-value of either the coefficient of the political and civil rights variable (columns (1) and (2)), or of a Wald-test
of the significance of 2xpolitical and civil rights – analog penetration ratio - coefficient + analog penetration ratio
coefficient (columns (3)-(5)). Two is the smallest value of political and civil rights.
Test 2 = p-value of the coefficient of the political and civil rights – analog penetration ratio- coefficient.
LR1 = p-value of an LR-test of joint significance of all variables.
LR2 = p-value of an LR-test of joint significance of all variables used in column (4) but not in column (3).
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Figure 2
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APPENDIX
Table A.1. lists countries that were excluded from our analysis because they divide their geographic
areas into several operating areas. This means that having multiple firms is not necessarily an
indication of there being competition. We excluded a country even if such a geographical split was
introduced later than the adoption of mobile phones. For example, Taiwan adopted mobile phones in
1989, and split its markets geographically in 1997.
Table A.1
Countries with Multiple Operating
Areas
Country Number of Areas
China 31
Mexico 9
Argentina 3
Japan 3
Brazil 10
Colombia 3
India 4
Taiwan 3
Canada 13
US missing
In Table A.2 we report those countries which introduced competition in the first year  when
mobile phone services were offered.
Table A.2
Countries with Initial Competition
Country
Year of Adopting Mobile
Phones
Number of Firms Digital Technology
Installed
Sweden 1982 2 No
United Kingdom 1985 2 No
Hong Kong 1986 2 No
Pakistan 1990 2 No
Estonia 1992 2 No
Greece 1993 2 Yes
Lebanon 1995 2 Yes
Côte d'Ivoire 1996 3 Yes
Guinea Republic 1996 2 Yes
Botswana 1998 2 Yes
NOTE: The sample of countries is conditioned on there being only one operating area for mobile phone
operators. We define that there is digital technology in country i by time of introduction of mobile phones if
there was a digital (2G) network in operation in the first year that mobile phone services were available in
country i.
